From the magazine – The attacks by Somali pirates on Western cargo ships in particular could still be dismissed as a regional crisis. But the Houthis’ attack with Iranian missiles on shipping company Spliethoff’s Minervagracht last September meant that Dutch merchant ships are no longer safe from Iranian despots and their Yemeni accomplices. The North Sea has seen threats increase due to Russian espionage and drone terror. And because a large part of container traffic between Asia and Europe takes the long detour around South Africa, reducing CO2 emissions is not going to happen either. These are all consequences of geopolitical crises that are also having a major impact on international shipping.
In every issue of SWZ|Maritime, SWZ|Maritime’s editor Antoon Oosting writes an opinion piece under the heading “Markets” about the maritime industry or a particular sector within it. In the December 2025 issue, he discusses the impact of geopolitical crises on shipping. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher (the SWZ Foundation), the KNVTS, or other editors.
All the more reason, then, for the Dutch Association of Captains of the Merchant Navy (NVKK), together with the shipowners’ association KVNR, to put the subject of safety in shipping on the agenda for the annual symposium held on 25 November at the Delta Hotel in Vlaardingen.
According to Rob de Wijk, founder of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), the security situation in Europe is very worrying due to Russia’s hybrid warfare involving cyber attacks and drone operations, and the Russians’ mapping of the undersea infrastructure in the North Sea. And according to De Wijk, we cannot count on support of the Americans for this, but as Europeans, we will have to defend ourselves against Russian threats.
Also read: IMO and shipping in the crossfire of global politics
Changing world order
According to De Wijk, to understand how geopolitical challenges converge in the North Sea, one must truly examine the changing world order, with an increasingly aggressive Russia versus the West and the rise of China as a new world power. A world order determined by state capitalism and autocracy versus democracy and world order.
According to De Wijk, China and the US under Trump are pursuing mercantilism, an economic policy that aims to increase national wealth, mainly by maximising exports and minimising imports. Transactional (trade) relations are decisive in this respect: you trade purely for your own benefit. Respect for human rights, free trade with fair competition and respect for the international legal order no longer matter.
De Wijk, a historian who has become an expert in international relations and security issues, says this geopolitical shift has been visible for 25 years. 2011 was a tipping point, with China and Asia becoming more powerful and the West, the US and especially Europe in decline. Since then, American presidents, starting with Obama, followed by Trump and Biden, have focused more on Asia than on their European allies. ‘We in Europe have not sufficiently realised this,’ says De Wijk.
Trump is pro-Russia
According to De Wijk, the speech given by American Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference on 25 January this year also shows that the US and Europe no longer share the same values. People like Trump and Vance, for example, question the value of NATO. De Wijk points out that Trump no longer wants to be the Free West’s leader. He is pro-Russia and turning away from his allies. He is dismantling the existing world order and undermining European security.
But according to De Wijk, Trump and his followers do not realise that turning away from Europe and other hitherto loyal allies, such as Canada and Japan, will only lead to a decline in the importance of the US for all its former allies. This is accelerating geopolitical change in the world.
This shift in geopolitical power is already noticeable in global trade flows, says De Wijk. In September, China’s exports to the US fell by 27 per cent compared to a year earlier, while those to Europe rose by 14.2 per cent and to Africa by 56.4 per cent. ‘The allies are turning away from the US and turning to America’s arch-enemy China. And this is a very dangerous existential development for the US,’ warns De Wijk. According to him, history teaches us that whoever wins the industrial revolution also wins (world) power.
Also read: Trump threatens to sabotage clean shipping
Number 1 in technologies
Technologically, China is already number 1, states De Wijk, but it is not yet the dominant power that determines developments. China owes its number 1 position in technology mainly to the control it has now gained in 64 critical technologies, such as defence, space, energy, environment, artificial technology, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. From 2003 to 2007, the US led in sixty of the 64 technologies, now in seven. China led in three of the 64 technologies, now in 57 of the 64. China is now in the process of converting its great economic power into military power.
New power blocs are also emerging in the changing world order. De Wijk: ‘Trump has now split the Western bloc in two.’ In addition, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Myanmar, Cambodia, Pakistan, Laos and North Korea are or are becoming economic and often political vassal states of China. The Western bloc has fallen apart, with the EU on one side and, so far, the US, UK, Australia, the so-called AUKUS alliance, South Korea and Japan on the other, as long as Trump does not antagonise these allies.
The rest of the world has united in what is known as The Coalition of the South, also called the Global South, and a number of countries have not yet chosen sides, such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Mexico. But according to De Wijk, India in particular has the potential to emerge as a leader of the Global South: ‘You see that trade relations are increasingly becoming political relations.’
Global supply chains
Meanwhile, China will only continue to strengthen its grip on global supply chains. De Wijk sees AI as a wonderful tool for China to make these chains more efficient and thereby dominate them. In the new geopolitical world, he believes that flow security – control over supply and production chains – is key. Control over data, goods, people, services, ideas, knowledge, money, and such is essential for this.
‘What happens when the world breaks down into warring geopolitical blocs? Economic systems can come under serious pressure as a result,’ says De Wijk. As an example, he points to the conflict with China over Nexperia, which led to China blocking the supply of chips to the automotive industry in Europe and the US, threatening to bring car factories to a standstill.
The same applies to the extraction and processing of critical rare earth metals, where China already has a large monopoly. According to De Wijk, Europe must therefore not only rebuild its industry, but also resume mining, both at home and in Africa.
Also read: Dutch navy gets new fleet, but will have to wait for it
Reduced efficiency
Rivalry between major powers leads to the decoupling of global trade in “friendshoring” and “nearshoring”, but also to disruption of transhipment in ports, punitive tariffs and sanctions. The relocation of production closer to home or to politically stable or friendly countries is resulting in increased investment in Southeast Asia, Mexico and Eastern Europe as alternatives to China.
The result is shorter, more regional supply chains, greater resilience, but also reduced efficiency. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shifted trade flows in oil, gas and coal. Tensions in the Middle East are disrupting important sea routes. The result is volatile energy markets and increased investment in renewable energy sources and alternative suppliers.
Free seas in danger
The “free seas” are also in danger. A closure of the Strait of Malacca would be disastrous for shipping and global trade. The Houthis’ rockets make shipping between China and Europe take much longer and more expensive. Meanwhile, the GIUK Gap, the straits between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom, is also becoming important again for monitoring the Russian submarine fleet’s movements in particular, just as it was during the Cold War. NATO will need more ships for this purpose.
And then there is Russian hybrid warfare, which has so far mainly targeted the Gulf of Finland and Baltic Sea. It is feared that the Russians will outsource physical attacks on (digital) infrastructure to criminals to create chaos. The Russian secret services are already using hacker groups for digital theft in the West. In November, the Russian spy ship Yanthar was once again found to be surveying British offshore wind farm cables. The number of cases of organised violence, (attempted) murder, arson or explosions has increased enormously the past year.
Legal restrictions
Everywhere, the West and NATO are encountering all kinds of restrictions. For example, dealing with the Russian shadow fleet is extremely difficult. This became apparent in the case of the Eagle S, which is suspected of destroying important cables between Finland and the Baltic states.
There are now 557 ships on the blacklist. If one of these often older, rusty tankers has an accident, for example in the North Sea, then according to De Wijk, the countries involved, particularly in Europe, cannot count on receiving a penny in compensation. ‘Dealing with the Russian shadow fleet is a really big legal problem,’ says De Wijk. He feels the most effective measures are the US sanctions imposed on the front men behind the ownership of the shadow fleet tankers.
Respond to this article by sending an e-mail to Robin Zander, SWZ|Maritime’ss editor-in-chief: redactie@swzmaritime.nl.
Cartoon by Hans de Wilde/SWZ|Maritime.
