Make sure the gob rope of a tug is in the right place. In a new Nautical Institute Mars Report, a tug with gob rope still capsized within just ten seconds. The accident resulted in two fatalities.

The Nautical Institute gathers reports of maritime accidents and near-misses. It then publishes these so-called Mars (Mariners’ Alerting and Reporting Scheme) Reports (anonymously) to prevent other accidents from happening. This is one of these reports.

A small passenger vessel was approaching port after conducting post-refit sea trials and a pilot had embarked for the docking. The plan, as discussed between the master and the pilot, was to turn the vessel 180 degrees and enter the confined dock area with the assistance of one tug forward and one aft, berthing the vessel starboard side to.

The pilot took the con, and slow ahead on both engines was ordered. The master inquired what speed was required for the aft tug to connect; the pilot responded that they could go up to 7 knots and noted that slow ahead had just been ordered. The passenger ship passed Number 1 Buoy and entered the main navigational channel at a speed of 6 knots.

Also read: Sailing cargo vessel capsizes and sinks, two missing

Tug’s bridles passed to passenger vessel

The pilot called the master of the aft tug on VHF radio, directing them to approach and pass the tug’s bridle to the aft mooring party on the passenger vessel. The pilot remained on the bridge, and the master went to the starboard bridge wing to watch the tug make its approach. The aft tug matched the passenger vessel’s speed, and the mooring party pulled the towlines on board.

About three minutes later, dead slow ahead on both engines was ordered on the passenger vessel. Shortly afterwards, it was reported that the two lines of the aft tug’s bridle had been made fast on the port and starboard side of the passenger vessel’s poop deck. The forward tug began approaching for their connection. The passenger vessel was now making 4.6 knots.

The passenger vessel’s route and tug boat orders.
The passenger vessel’s route and tug boat orders (picture by The Nautical Institute).

Once the forward tug was connected, the pilot directed: ‘After tug minimum dead astern’ on VHF. The aft tug’s master responded: ‘Do you want me swinging off pilot and go dead astern?’, to which the pilot replied: ‘Yeah, dead astern minimum please’. Closed-circuit television images show the aft tug now turning to starboard and peeling away from the passenger vessel’s starboard side then dropping astern.

On the aft tug’s deck, the starboard bridle became taut. The tug’s turn stalled with its heading now approximately 45 degrees to the right of the passenger vessel’s track. The tug was quickly pulled sideways by the bridle and almost immediately heeled to port. It capsized within ten seconds. Some of the aft mooring party on the passenger vessel threw lifebuoys overboard and looked for survivors, while one crew rushed to the galley for a knife to cut the tug’s bridle.

The rescue efforts notwithstanding, the inverted tug sank within thirty minutes, taking the two crew with it. The victims were later recovered, but were deceased.

Also read: Service boat sinks during crew change

Investigation findings

The investigation found that, considering the speed (4.6 knots), the tug had just over ten seconds to reverse direction into its new position astern of the passenger vessel before its weight came onto the towlines. Instead, the tug’s turn stalled and the bridle came under tension.

The tug was using a gob rope, but this did not prevent the tug being towed sideways.

The tug’s emergency tow hook release was found to be operating correctly after the accident, but it is hypothesised that the crew did not have enough time to operate it before capsizing.

Also read: Dynamic separation of soil cargo contributes to sinking

Advice from The Nautical Institute

  • Research shows that the heeling force exerted on a tug is proportional to the square of the towing speed. As such, the heeling moment generated at 4.6 knots was more than twice that generatedat 3 knots and five times that generated at 2 knots.
  • The passenger vessel’s speed at the time of the manoeuvre exceeded the 2-3 knots recommended by both industry and the local port towing guidelines.
  • Investigations into similar girting accidents found that it was essential that conventional tugs use a gob rope during towing operations to ensure the safety of the tug. To be fully effective, this rope must be correctly set and secured. A gob rope must be as low in the vessel as possible and as close as possible to the tug’s transom.
  • The gob rope in this case was led through a bow shackle 2.8 metres behind the towing hook, about 0.5 metre above the deck and over 1 metre from the tug’s transom. This gob rope arrangement was unlikely to be as effective as one rigged closer to the transom. It is thus possible that this arrangement left the tug more vulnerable to being towed sideways and girted.
  • It is essential for safe operations that the master, pilot and tug masters agree and share a common understanding of the planned manoeuvre. In this case, there was ambiguity and lack of information amongst the team.
  • Cutting the tug bridle may have changed the outcome had it been done before the tug capsized. As it was, a crew member on the passenger vessel had to run to the galley for a knife.

Mars Reports

This accident was covered in the Mars Reports, originally published as Mars 202506, that are part of Report Number 388. A selection of the Mars Reports are also published in the SWZ|Maritime magazine. The Nautical Institute compiles these reports to help prevent maritime accidents. That is why they are also published (in full) on SWZ|Maritime’s website.

More reports are needed to keep the scheme interesting and informative. All reports are read only by the Mars coordinator and are treated in the strictest confidence. To submit a report, please use the Mars report form.

Picture (top): The tug capsized within ten minutes (picture by The Nautical Institute).