(Mars 201902) A large loaded bulk carrier was inbound. The master and pilot were conducting an exchange of information including the harbour passage plan produced by the harbour authority.
Edited from official report MO-2016-204 of the TAIC (New Zealand)
During the entry, the vessel’s speed was reduced and a line was secured to a tug aft. The tug then followed behind the bulk carrier with no weight on the line.
To Starboard of the Intended Track
The leading marks showed that the vessel was to starboard of the intended track, which the pilot was aware of. The pilot made a succession of helm orders for 5°, 10° and then 15° of port helm and then ordered the helm to amidships in anticipation of the change in direction of the tidal set. Noticing that the vessel was still to starboard of the line of the leading beacons, he ordered 5° then 10° of port helm and then ordered the helm to amidships. The members of the bridge team, including the pilot, then felt a bump.
Grounded
Initially, they thought it was the aft tug bumping the stern of the vessel. The pilot saw that the speed was reducing and he noted that the vessel’s head was swinging to starboard despite the 10° of port helm being applied. Both the master and the pilot realised the vessel had grounded, and ordered stop engines, half astern and full astern in quick succession.
With the help of the stern tug the vessel was quickly refloated and the vessel was berthed without further incident.
Some of the findings of the official report were:
- The grounding occurred because the bridge team, including the pilot, lost situational awareness. Although the pilot was aware that the vessel had deviated starboard of the intended track, the extent of that deviation was not known because the vessel’s progress was not being monitored effectively and by all available means.
- The vessel’s ECDIS was not correctly configured for navigation in a narrow channel. As a result, crew members were not adequately monitoring the progress of the vessel in support of the pilot, who was navigating mainly by visual references.
Lessons Learned
- In restricted waters, even 30 seconds delay or hastiness in helm orders could mean the difference between afloat and aground. Support the pilot by giving your input and voicing any concerns promptly.
- Maintain your situational awareness by keeping an eye on your (properly adjusted) ECDIS.
- The published port passage plan was not entered into the vessel’s ECDIS, so this valuable information was of no practical benefit.
MARS Reports
This is one of the January MARS Reports that are part of Report Number 315. A selection of this Report has also been published in SWZ|Maritime’s February issue.
Acknowledgement
Through the kind intermediary of The Nautical Institute we gratefully acknowledge sponsorship provided by:
American Bureau of Shipping, AR Brink & Associates, Britannia P&I Club, Cargill, Class NK, DNV, Gard, IHS Fairplay Safety at Sea International, International Institute of Marine Surveying, Lairdside Maritime Centre, London Offshore Consultants, MOL Tankship Management (Europe) Ltd, Noble Denton, North of England P&I Club, Sail Training International, Shipowners Club, The Marine Society and Sea Cadets, The Swedish Club, UK Hydrographic Office, West of England P&I Club
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