(Mars 201901) A bulk carrier weighed anchor and, with two pilots on the bridge, proceeded towards the port approach channel at a speed of about 3 kt. 

As edited from official MAIB report 8/2018

Due to the westerly course set across the channel entrance, the vessel’s heading was adjusted to keep to east of centre of the dredged channel.

This was well intentioned given that the vessel had experienced a minor bottom touching at the western side of the entrance on the first, unsuccessful, attempt to enter the port the day before. While the master oversaw the operation, the OOW operated the engine telegraph and monitored the vessel’s position using radar parallel indices. The helmsman remained at the steering stand.

Different Starboard Helm Orders

As the vessel passed between No. 3 and No. 4 lateral markers on a heading of 163˚ at nearly 5 kt, there was an exchange between the two pilots about an alteration of heading to starboard. During the exchange, the pilots gave different starboard helm orders, which prompted the helmsman to seek clarification from the master. The master told the helmsman to follow only his orders. 

Seconds later, shuddering and heavy vibration was felt on board and the vessel’s speed reduced for a few seconds to less than 3 kt.

Although the bulk carrier was thereafter safely berthed, a dive inspection identified a series of splits, deep indentations and buckling of the shell plating on the port side that required drydock repairs.

Some of the report’s findings include:

  • In view of the tidal set experienced the previous day, it was logical to keep the vessel towards the eastern side of the dredged channel.
  • The embarked pilots, although experienced elsewhere, were not fully familiar with this particular port and its approaches and had completed only two previous pilotage acts in the port.
  • The narrowness of the dredged channel and the potential for squat limited the action that could be taken on board larger vessels to counter the effects of a tidal set and to remain within the dredged channel.
  • The lateral markers indicating the dredged channel were potentially misleading as they were sited up to 50 m outside the channel. This fact was not clear from the chart due to its scale.

Editor’s note: As the diagram above (to scale) illustrates, given this vessel’s dimensions there was very little margin for error in the narrow dredged channel. Had a proper risk assessment been performed before the entry it may have become evident that one or more assisting tugs would have made the entry much safer, even assuming slack water.

MARS Reports

This is one of the January MARS Reports that are part of Report Number 315. A selection of this Report has also been published in SWZ|Maritime’s February issue.

Acknowledgement

Through the kind intermediary of The Nautical Institute we gratefully acknowledge sponsorship provided by:
American Bureau of Shipping, AR Brink & Associates, Britannia P&I Club, Cargill, Class NK, DNV, Gard, IHS Fairplay Safety at Sea International, International Institute of Marine Surveying, Lairdside Maritime Centre, London Offshore Consultants, MOL Tankship Management (Europe) Ltd, Noble Denton, North of England P&I Club, Sail Training International, Shipowners Club, The Marine Society and Sea Cadets, The Swedish Club, UK Hydrographic Office, West of England P&I Club

Submit a Mars Report

More reports are needed to keep the scheme interesting and informative. All reports are read only by the Mars coordinator and are treated in the strictest confidence. To submit a report, please use the Mars report form and send it to mars@nautinst.org.