The Netherlands has managed to maintain its own naval shipbuilding cluster, but pressure is mounting for more European cooperation. Is this a threat or opportunity?
SWZ|Maritime's November issue is a Navy Special coordinated by Jaap Huisman, a former Defence employee who has been involved with naval vessel building projects throughout his career. He contributed an article of his own to this special in which he discusses the mounting pressure on more European cooperation and past and present alliances between the Netherlands and other European countries concerning the build of naval vessels.
A translation of his article can be found below or download the original article (in Dutch, PDF) here.
Self-creating Naval Shipbuilding under European Pressure?
The construction of frigates in the Netherlands and relations with surrounding countries
The Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) is facing important replacement projects; those for minehunters have already been set in motion, while those for the Dutch and Belgian frigates and submarines will follow soon. Since the Second World War, the Netherlands has opted to develop its naval vessels in a close cooperation of navy, knowledge institutes and industry. This has resulted in a self-creating naval cluster, but pressure to allow for more European cooperation is mounting. Yet, this development also offers opportunities and may lift the Dutch naval shipbuilding industry to a European level. An outline of the developments.
After the war, the navy was rebuilt energetically. The two cruisers of which both keels had already been laid before the war, were finished. Subsequently, sixteen A- and B-hunters were built. Ath this time, the larger ships were designed by the RNLN's "Bureau Scheepsbouw" and then developed by the Nevesbu ("Nederlandse Verenigde Scheepsbouw Bureaus", founded in 1935) into a quotation and contract specifications.
The "Nederlandsche Dok en Scheepsbouw Maatschappij" (NDSM) in Amsterdam, "Wilton Feijenoord" (WF), the "Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij" (RDM) and the "Koninklijke Maatschappij De Schelde" (KMS) all participated in Nevsbu. These yards were then designated to build the ships. There was no competition. However, competition was put on the tender of the frigates of the Van Speijk class in 1962. These six ships were eventually divided between the NDSM and the KMS. The frigates were based on the English Leander class design, GW- and S-frigates.
Fleet Renewal
In 1964 a plan was developed for fleet renewal. The airship and cruisers were replaced by long-haul patrol planes and guided weapon frigates. The A- and B-hunters by standard frigates.
The design of the guided weapon frigates was started in 1965 and the construction of the two ships started in 1971. The design of the S frigates started in 1969. The first keel was laid in 1975. Twelve of these would eventually be built, the last one in 1980. In 1981 the keel was laid of two air defense frigates based on the design of the S frigates, but where the helicopter was replaced by a long-range air defense system.
Massive Changes
It was a time of massive renewal and change. Due to the increased threat from Russian submarines, anti-submarine warfare became a high priority. The threat of guided weapons at sea was also recognised and this placed high demands on the sensors and weapons. The propulsion system changed from steam engines to gas turbines, changing the way training and maintenance were organised. Perhaps the biggest development took place in the automation from analogue to digital.
Appointed Shipyard and Suppliers
In the meantime, after the RSV debacle (shipbuilding group "Rijn-Schelde-Verolme Machinefabrieken en Scheepswerven NV" (RSV) was a combination of shipyards and machine factories that came into being in early 1971 and collapsed in 1983 as a result of many causes arising from the crisis in heavy shipbuilding at the time, ed.), KMS had been appointed as the master builder of the larger surface vessels and RDM specialised in the production of submarines.
All the frigates mentioned were built by KMS (with the exception of two frigates that were put out to tender with WF) and that heralded the start of a naval construction cluster, in which not only the shipyard, but also permanent subsuppliers were chosen, who could build up sufficient knowledge and experience for these increasingly complex ships. Thales supplied sensors and fire control systems. This company has always been of great importance to the navy since its establishment in 1922. Imtech was responsible for the electrical installation and platform automation. The gas turbines were supplied by Rolls-Royce.
Open Budget
Because there was no competition, an open budget was used and every part of the vessel was negotiated from the specifications, both technically and financially. A disadvantage was that the yard did not immediately feel called to innovation.
Professionalised Management
On the side of the navy, the management was professionalised. This also created more bureaucracy and regulations. Especially after the Walrusaffaire in 1985, the authority and responsibilities of the project leader were defined and demarcated in relation to the technical departments. The reporting obligation was tightly regulated.
Operational Software in House
The "stafeisen" (list of requirements) are the responsibility of the navy staff and are the dominant document in the process. These requirements are based on an analysis of the threat, the technology available or that can still be made available in the meantime and of course the budget.
A preliminary design was developed by the shipbuilding office. An iterative process, because a compromise acceptable to all parties was never found at once. Together with the master builder and the Nevesbu, a set of specifications was developed. Then, often through lengthy negotiations, a contract was reached.
Ministry Acquires SEWACO
A striking feature of the Dutch approach is that the Ministry itself acquires the sensor, weapon and command systems (SEWACO). This is in contrast to what is customary in many countries, where the entire project is usually placed with a main contractor. In the Netherlands, the ship platform is purchased separately, while the operational software is developed and produced in-house. This certainly saves costs, because it avoids the usually large financial margin of a master builder on the so-called SEWACO system.
However, it does introduce a planning problem between the delivery times of the platform and the SEWACO system, which often solves itself only with difficulty. In addition, the Ministry takes responsibility for the proper functioning of the weapons system and everything related to it. In practice, however, this is not a real problem because the master builder cannot bear this responsibility for complex military systems.
The navy, therefore, has its own software house for the development, production and maintenance of operational software, for example for the air defence system. Due to the rapid technological developments and increasing threat, this software has an increasingly important role. By carrying out this development in-house, the experience on board can be fed back directly. The developments are preferably carried out in an "evolutionary" process. This prevents major errors and therefore high costs.
Multipurpose Frigates
In 1980, the design of the so-called multipurpose frigate was started, as a replacement for the Van Speijk frigates and the Predator class. The "stafeisen" offered many new challenges. In the first place, the ship had to be cheaper to buy and maintain than the S-frigat. This meant smaller dimensions, introduction of more civil standards and less personnel on board. The latter demanded automation and preferably using the latest developments. This meant that the ship was operated from the technical centre, command centre and bridge using, for example, screens and keyboards.
Although some of them were already used on board the Walrus class, many applications still had to be developed, such as mimics for propulsion, damage control and fire fighting. Typically, a lot of ergonomic research was carried out during the development of the mimics and the living and working environment, in which mock-ups were also built and tested by future personnel. This has enabled the ship to distinguish itself.
This frigate also had the task of combating submarines in addition to self-defence against, among other things, the threat of guide weapons. This meant that a lot of effort was made to limit the underwater noise as much as possible and also to minimize radar reflection and infrared radiation.
In addition, the experiences of the British Navy during the Falklandoorlog in 1982 were also processed: the ship's resilience was increased, bulkheads were strengthened, fire insulation was installed and fire extinguishing equipment was improved.
A complaint about the S-frigat was that the ship took over relatively much green water in seas, which led to damage to the superstructure and systems. Intensive and systematic model research at Marin led to the lines plan being optimised for sea access and propulsion characteristics.
"Polder Model"
A true cluster of industry, knowledge institutes and navy emerged around the M frigates project. In addition to project groups, working groups were set up to devise the necessary solutions. Despite opposing interests, especially in the financial field, workable compromises were always found in this "polder model". Parts of the specifications were made to fit within the financial budget. During this period, the navy had the necessary knowledge in almost all relevant areas. The working method proved to be effective and fairly efficient.
From NFR90 to LCF
In 1979 NATO took the initiative to carry out a feasibility study on a joint frigate (Nato Fregate Replacement of the 1990, NFR90). Seven countries participated in this project, including the Netherlands, with a view to replacing the GW frigate. An initial report was published in 1981, after which eight countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1984 to arrive at a joint study. This study carried out by the industry resulted in a voluminous document with a description of all possible options.
Definition Phase Reveals Differences
It was then decided to start a definition phase. A number of important differences soon became visible, such as in the area of the air defence system, number of crew members, the propulsion system and even the number of decks was a point of attention. Nevertheless, it was possible to present a design in September 1989.
However, later that month England, France and Italy left the project, followed in December by Spain, Germany and the Netherlands. The largest weapons project ever had failed. Bridging the major national industrial interests proved impossible. The costs also turned out to be higher than expected.
Air Defence System
An important bone of contention was the air defence system. This system is not only intended for self-defence of the ship, but is also capable of defending a larger area or context against missiles. The research into and development of this system was so expensive that – except for the US – international cooperation was necessary.
Canada, Germany and the Netherlands were in favour of a US-led NATO project, while France, England, Italy and Spain opted for a European project. These countries, without Spain, continued to work together on the Horizon project. The Netherlands, Spain and Germany continued together under the Trilateral Frigate Cooperation (TFC), in which an actual attempt was made to arrive at a joint design of platform and weapon systems.
New Sensors Needed
The threat of guided weapons also demanded completely new sensor systems. To this end, a project had already been started with Canada, the Netherlands and Germany. In the TFC, Spain would also make use of this sensor development, but the country eventually opted for an entirely American system, as a result of which only cooperation with Germany was possible. Canada continued to participate in the development of the sensor package, especially in the field of infrared, but did not purchase the system.
So the Netherlands and Germany continued together. Intensive efforts were made to purchase other systems in addition to the air defence system, such as propulsion, but national interests continued to prevail and only the common Anti Air Warfare System was the result of long years of meetings.
Air Defence and Command Frigate (LCF)
This meant that the Netherlands independently designed the Air Defence and Command Frigate (LCF) and applied the knowledge gained in international cooperation and also built on its own experiences. These four ships became a highlight in Dutch naval shipbuilding.
Shrinking Budgets
In the 1990s, major cuts were made and the knowledge of the navy was increasingly limited to military maritime knowledge and support was provided for other areas of institutes and industry. Despite the shrinking budgets, the working method of the naval shipbuilding cluster remained unchanged, even during the projects of the four Offshore Patrol Vessels, the Landing Platform Docks and the Joint Support Ship. Even the honorary title Golden Triangle is used for this, which may indicate that the cooperation in this cluster only became stronger, although sometimes competition between subsuppliers was preferred over fixed partner choice.
Cooperation with British Royal Navy
For years, attempts have been made to increase international cooperation. After the war, the cooperation with the British Royal Navy was important and yielded a lot of technical knowledge. This cooperation was arranged through the Anglo Netherlands Cooperation Projects. Besides the cooperation for the Van Speijk frigates, the introduction of gas turbines was also an important theme. In the English T23- and M-frigates project the exchange of designers even took place and we got access to important information about the Falklandoorlog. Later this cooperation became less intensive, but remained active on research topics such as the resilience of ships.
Dutch-German Naval Ship Cooperation MoU
Since 1990 the Dutch-German Naval Ship Cooperation MoU has been working together in all areas and aspects of the naval vessel. Although a lot of knowledge and information was exchanged, regulations were developed, common test centres were created and even a knowledge centre, it proved impossible to come to a common project.
Cooperation with Sweden
A similar cooperation was later established with Sweden and a joint project in the field of tugboats was developed. In addition, much knowledge was exchanged in this relationship, especially in the field of submarine design and maintenance. The tugs project was also an exercise in cooperation with a view to one day arriving at a joint submarine project. The latter proved to be an important strategic goal for the Swedes.
Benesam
The Benesam agreement exists with Belgium and Luxembourg. The successful tripartite mine hunter project was carried out together with France and Belgium. The most intensive cooperation grew with Belgium. Belgium eventually acquired two M frigates, with the Dutch navy being responsible for conservation and training, among other things. Meanwhile, Belgium is responsible for the conservation of Dutch minehunters.
The Netherlands is currently leading the M-frigat replacement project for both countries and Belgium the new mine-hunter project. These are far-reaching decisions, because Belgium has a different acquisition strategy and relies more on industry than the Netherlands. It fits in with the formulated policy to achieve more cooperation with neighbouring countries.
Germany Opts for European Tender
In Germany a decision is expected in the shorter term to acquire six Mehrzweckampfschiff (MKS) 180 frigates. The Germans have taken the remarkable decision not to opt for a national project, which has hitherto been customary in complex projects such as frigates, but to opt for a European tender. Although this is the formal way forward in the European Union, experience with previous projects also led the Ministry to organise European competition.
Damen in the Running
Although the complex procurement process suffered delays, decision-making would now be in sight. Combinations of companies may no longer be changed after the formal notification, but after BAE-systems left the team of German Naval Yards, this yard has been continuing since August this year with Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems (TKMS) as subsupplier. Furthermore, in this final phase only Damen is still in the race in combination with Blohm und Voss (this yard is owned by Lürssen, which was previously excluded from further competition with TKMS). So there are only two combinations left. In this way Damen can present itself as a specialised company.
Consolidation of European Maritime Defence Industry
This process of European tendering can lead to an important step in the consolidation of the European maritime defence industry. It is also not impossible that if Damen acquires this order together with Blohm & Voss, this could also have an impact on future naval projects and thus on the future of naval shipbuilding in the Netherlands.
Dutch Naval Shipbuilding to a European Level?
In the forthcoming replacement of the M-frigat, the Netherlands seems to follow the usual national route and to want to make generous use of Article 346 to obtain an exception to the European tender. Although both projects have a modular design and the functional requirements do not differ significantly, the MKS 180 is too large and too expensive for the Dutch and Belgian navies. It will be an interesting time in which it may be possible to bring Dutch naval shipbuilding to a European level.
Picture: One of the four Dutch air defense and command frigates (LCF's) of the De Zeven Provinciënklasse, the Zr. Ms. Evertsen.
