Navigational aids should be used to help position a vessel, but also to give the bridge team the most complete situational awareness possible. In addition, bridge crew and pilot need to work together to ensure a safe voyage.
This month's Mars Report features two collisions "in plain sight". Read the full Mars Report (a selection of which was published in SWZ|Maritime's February issue) below.
Slip on Stairs – Two Month Recovery: Mars 201801
While at sea the crew were mustered for various emergency drills, including the shipboard oil pollution emergency plan (SOPEP), followed by an abandon ship drill and then a fire drill. After the abandon ship drill, a crew member was proceeding to his fire muster station on the poop deck, with his lifejacket in his hand. He was using the external companionway ladder, as this was the shortest route. On his way down one flight of stairs, he slipped and fell along the stairs and to the deck below. The vessel was rolling slightly and pitching due to sea and swell and there was salt deposit and moisture on the steps and railing of the companion ladder. He was given first aid on board the vessel and after several days sent ashore for more examinations. He was diagnosed with a contusion of the left shoulder and repatriated. The injury was expected to take about two months to heal completely.
Lessons Learned
- Carrying a lifejacket in one hand while coming down the stairs means you probably cannot maintain a three-point contact with the companionway ladder.
- Outside stairs on vessels are often slippery because of dampness and salt deposits. Caution and deliberate attention to safe technique is required.
- While emergencies and drills can be stressful and by their nature require immediate action, this does not mean one should rush impetuously and forget best practices.
Editor’s note: This relatively innocuous event happens more often than we care to admit. Most times the consequences are not serious, but in this case it cost the seaman two months recuperation. Why roll the dice when it comes to your safety on stairs? Use both hands and both railings.
EGE Fire: Mars 201802
While at sea a crew member aboard a container vessel noticed sparks coming from the main engine funnel. The exhaust gas economiser (EGE) gas outlet high temperature alarm activated shortly afterwards. An EGE fire was declared and the main engine was stopped. After an adequate cooling down period, crew opened the inspection door of the EGE and found extensive damage to the tubes, tube support and fins of the upper steam generator. Some of the tubes were cracked and deformed, and the fins were melted (see picture). Although temporary repairs were carried out to maintain operations, a large-scale permanent repair was scheduled for the next dry dock. The company investigation suggests that inefficient soot blowing probably caused soot accumulation on the tubes, resulting in the soot fire. It appears that soot blowing was often carried out using air pressure but without increasing the engine load.
Lessons Learned
- Regular soot blowing should be carried out on board vessels with EGEs.
- When carrying out soot blowing, best practice is to increase engine load.
- Monitor soot accumulation on tubes by opening the manholes at regular intervals. Additionally, review the operational data on a daily basis (EGE draught loss, outlet temperature, steam damp valve openings, available power, etc).
Chain Sling Breaks, Strikes Stevedore: Mars 201803
A vessel was at berth discharging a steel cargo and then loading containers. The containers were being lashed with chain slings. While one of the containers was being secured, a chain sling broke at its hook and hit the stevedore on the head; his helmet was cracked by the impact. The victim fell to the deck and was treated for his injuries. He received several stitches and 11 days of medical leave. The chain was not very old, but on investigation it was found that no schedule of inspection or maintenance of the lashing equipment was available.
Lessons Learned
- Ships’ crews need to adopt safety systems that allow inspection and documentation of tackle such as chain slings.
- It is good practice to visually examine a sling before using it.
Touch Bottom in Uncertain Waters: Mars 201804
A tanker was loading at a river location. The Master had requested confirmation of the maximum allowed sailing draught as well as the actual depths of the river, taking into account the peculiarities of the season (river flood) and a recent tropical storm that could affect water depth. The information received was that they could safely load up to a draught of 13.72 metres. Due to the cargo nomination they loaded to 13.55m before departure.
Once loading was completed, the vessel began the outbound passage under pilotage. After almost 10 hours underway the vessel temporarily touched bottom. The ship’s speed was reduced to zero and then regained. Only after several extreme helm applications was the vessel kept in the channel. It continued to anchorage for an underwater inspection and class attendance. The underwater survey showed that all four propeller blades had minor strike damage to their leading edges.
Several days after the incident, local authorities reduced the maximum allowed draught to 13.41m and limited traffic to one-way passage at the area of the incident.
The company investigation found, among other things, that:
- The touch bottom incident was quickly realised and the corrective actions were made immediately.
- The effectiveness of the bridge team was paramount. An inappropriate response to the incident could have led to grounding and/or severe damage to the propeller and the rudder.
Lessons Learned
- Remain ever vigilant even under pilotage, as quick, decisive action may be necessary to avoid bad outcomes.
- In river areas affected by a variety of factors that can influence water levels in unpredictable ways, even local authorities can sometimes be outside the envelope of safety.
Collision in Plain Sight: Mars 201805
As edited from official TSB Canada report M13L0123
A bulk carrier was down-bound in a river waterway. While the vessel was in a lock, there was a change of pilots. During the exchange, the disembarking pilot mentioned that it was difficult to communicate with the bridge crew because of their lack of proficiency in English.
After the arriving pilot had exchanged information with the Master, the vessel left the lock. The pilot requested the assistance of a police patrol boat from vessel traffic services (VTS) in order to clear any pleasure craft in the area below the lock exit, as many small boats were present for a fireworks show. As they progressed downriver, the Master left the bridge. The bridge team now consisted of the pilot, the officer of the watch (OOW) and the helmsman.
At about the same time, a port tug left its berth down-bound to assist another vessel. VTS granted authorisation for the tug and gave information on up-bound vessel traffic, but did not mention the down-bound bulk carrier exiting the lock.
No Radar or ECDIS
As visibility was good, the tug Master navigated visually and did not turn on the radar. The ECDIS was not used either. The bulk carrier, now making way at a speed near 12 knots, was upstream and behind the tug at a distance of approximately 0.9nm. The tug was visible to the pilot.
Communication Failure
On the bulk carrier the pilot asked the OOW to turn on the forward deck lights to make the vessel more visible to the pleasure craft and to have someone posted forward on the forecastle deck to stand by at the anchors. The OOW appeared not to understand; at any rate the requests were not acted on. The pilot asked for the Master to come to the bridge. When the Master arrived, the pilot again requested that the forward deck lights be turned on. The Master turned on the lights.
View of Tug Lost
The pilot, now on the port side of the bridge, observed three pleasure craft ahead of the bulk carrier moving towards the vessel. Two of them altered course to starboard in order to meet port to port. The third altered its course to port; in doing so, it disappeared from sight behind the bulk carrier’s cranes. The pilot went to the starboard side of the bridge in an attempt to see the third pleasure craft, but then lost sight of the tug. Not being able to see the pleasure craft, the pilot altered to port. When the pleasure craft became visible on the starboard side, the pilot ordered starboard 20° and then hard to starboard.
Once the swing of the vessel was stopped, the pilot ordered that the vessel be kept steady at 357°. By this time the tug was less than 100 m away on the port side, and the pilot was on the starboard side of the bridge – still without a view of the tug.
Collision
As the pilot walked back to the port side of the bridge, there was a screeching sound. The pilot now saw the tug on the port bow moving away from the bulk carrier. The Master on the tug had, at the last minute, become aware of the bulk carrier behind him and had engaged both engines in order to move away from the approaching vessel.
Following the collision, the tug’s engineer checked for water ingress. The pilot on the bulk carrier and the Master on the tug spoke over VHF radio and confirmed that they had collided and VTS was informed. The damage sustained by the tug was sufficient to merit a dry dock and it was out of service for almost seven weeks. The bulk carrier was not damaged, but traces of black rubber from the tug’s fenders were apparent on the hull.
Some of the findings of the official report were:
- The pilot on the bulk carrier was not monitoring the tug at the time of the collision. The bridge crew was not assisting the pilot by maintaining a lookout or using navigational equipment to advise the pilot of relevant traffic.
- The language barrier between the bridge crew and pilot contributed to communication difficulties and led to ineffective BRM at a critical time during the voyage.
- The VTS officer’s high mental workload at a critical time probably caused him to omit the down-bound bulk carrier when reporting traffic to the tug.
The Master on the tug was unaware of the bulk carrier for a variety of reasons:
- VTS had not reported the down-bound vessel.
- The Master was not using all available navigational equipment such as radar. l No effective lookout had been posted.
Lessons Learned
- It bears repeating that all navigational aids should be used not only to help position a vessel but also to give the bridge team the most complete situational awareness possible.
- If there are communication issues within the bridge team that is the time to redouble one’s vigilance.
- Vessel bridge crew and the pilot are a team and need to work together for a safer voyage.
No One Saw Anyone: Mars 201806
As edited from official ATSB report 311-MO-2014-006
A container vessel was under pilotage in coastal waters in darkness at about 17 knots. Besides the pilot, the bridge team included an OOW, a junior officer and a helmsman. The vessel was being conned by the pilot in a buoyed channel while the junior officer was plotting positions and the OOW was observing the radar. Visibility was good.
Meanwhile, a 13.4m steel sailing yacht was transiting the area under power, making about 4.5 knots. With a crew of two, the yacht was not using a radar nor AIS receiver so lookout possibilities were restricted to visual means.
The route of the yacht cut across the buoyed shipping channel and the crew did not see the oncoming container ship. Only at the last minute did the yacht helmsman see the vessel. He quickly put the rudder over to port and the engine throttle to full in an attempt to get clear of the ship. The yacht remained alongside the container vessel for about 30 seconds, bumping and scraping against its hull, until clear of the stern.
On board the container vessel no one had observed the yacht, either visually or by other means, and the crew were unaware of the collision. Yet, the investigation showed that the steel yacht appeared on the container vessel’s radar at least 20 minutes before the collision, as shown above.
Although the steel yacht was showing on the radar and was visible to the eye, the official investigation identified many factors why the yacht was not observed by the bridge team, including:
- No dedicated visual lookout was posted;
- Background shore lights made it difficult to distinguish the yacht;
- The bright lights of a nearby dredger caused distraction;
- Relatively low visual and radar detection range of the yacht;
- Yacht’s radar echo was not identified and actively monitored;
- Bridge team workload (four course changes in 22 minutes before collision and watch change);
- Bridge team members focused on individual tasks during that period of high workload;
- Inattentive lookout for small craft, although these could reasonably be expected in this area.
Lessons Learned
- Small craft are notoriously difficult to detect on radar, but if constant and diligent attention is applied these vessels can usually be detected at the 2-3 nm range.
- While some small craft are fitted with AIS transceivers, not all have them, nor are they required to do so.
Acknowledgement
Through the kind intermediary of The Nautical Institute we gratefully acknowledge sponsorship provided by:
American Bureau of Shipping, AR Brink & Associates, Britannia P&I Club, Cargill, Class NK, DNV, Gard, IHS Fairplay Safety at Sea International, International Institute of Marine Surveying, Lairdside Maritime Centre, London Offshore Consultants, MOL Tankship Management (Europe) Ltd, Noble Denton, North of England P&I Club, Sail Training International, Shipowners Club, The Marine Society and Sea Cadets, The Swedish Club, UK Hydrographic Office, West of England P&I Club
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