SWZ Maritime's March issue, which will appear tomorrow, will publish some of the reports from Mars no. 244. The full report is published here on SWZonline.
Mars (Marine Accident Reporting Scheme) Reports is one of the regular sections of SWZ Maritime Reports. We will publish all the reports we receive online, as they may prevent other accidents from happening. Mars Reports cover all kinds of maritime incidents such as (near) collisions and groundings, accidents with tools, falling objects injuring crew and accidents with rescue boats.
Oil-Soaked Waste Caused Fire on Deck: MARS 201304
Official report edited from MAIB Safety Digest 01-2012 – Case 2
Arriving at a river port after a short coastal passage, a container feeder vessel was transiting upriver under daytime pilotage, when the bridge team suddenly observed thick black smoke rising from forward. The fire alarm was activated and speed was reduced while the emergency team proceeded to the location, with two crewmembers wearing breathing apparatus. The fire was seen to be on a pile of rags and cotton waste and it was quickly extinguished with fire hoses.
Result of Investigation
Earlier during the voyage, linseed oil had leaked from a container that had been discharged at the previous port, after which the deck crew had mopped up the oil from the deck. It was intended to land the oilsoaked material at the next port, so the crew had collected and stowed it on deck overnight on a rubber mat abaft the forward wavebreaker.
The rags spontaneously heated to above the self-ignition temperature of the vegetable oil. The resulting fire caused substantial burn damage to adjacent electrical fittings and paintwork on the deck, vertical surfaces of the bulkhead and a ventilator cowl.
Fuel Leakage from Main Engine Fuel Pump: MARS 201305
A product tanker was proceeding on a long voyage after the completion of drydocking and associated surveys. During the ocean passage, the fire alarm suddenly activated in the engine room. Instead of a fire, the cause of the alarm turned out to be a large leakage of fuel oil from a flange on the inlet pipe of the main engine no. 4 fuel injection pump.
Result of Investigation
- The fuel system had been overhauled, but no senior ship’s engineer supervised its refitting in drydock. As they did not have a new spare, the yard workers had reused the gasket of the flange connection on the suction side of the fuel injection pump even though it was damaged.
- The insulation and leakage containment cover over the fuel line had not been renewed/refitted.
Lessons Learnt
- Proper planning is necessary in drydock and during major repairs to ensure that responsible officers are delegated to supervise the refitting of critical components.
- The condition, integrity and tightness of piping should be regularly checked, especially on critical equipment and fuel oil systems.
- The vessel must ensure that adequate quantities of original spare parts are available at all times, and that all gaskets are renewed whenever pipelines are opened up and reconnected.
- Wherever appropriate, lagging and containment covering must always be refitted, or renewed, if damaged.
- All defective parts discovered after an incident must be carefully preserved to allow detailed investigations and to establish the underlying cause(s) so that effective corrective and preventative actions can be taken.
Incorrect Use of Wire Clips: MARS 201306
In my nearly two decades of seafaring, I have rarely seen wire clips (bulldog grips) fitted the correct way. Before commencing loading operations, I always ensured that both stevedores and my deck crew understood the proper technique, and posted copies of the following diagram at strategic locations.
In my present role as a shore-based superintendent, I continue to encounter wrong methods of fitting of these clips as shown in the following photographs.
Editor’s note: One easy way of remembering the right way to fit wire clips is: The ‘U’-bolt of the clip is placed over the ‘U’nstressed part of the wire and the ‘S’addle of the clip is placed over the ‘S’tressed part of the wire.
Overloaded Electrical Socket and Defective Adaptor: MARS 201307
A newly-joined crewmember reported to the ship’s safety officer that many galley electrical appliances were connected to a single power outlet by using an adaptor. It was also observed that the cable terminations within the socket were loose and there was poor contact within the multiple outlets of the adaptor. Over a period, both the socket and the adaptor had overheated and could have led to a fire if the fault had gone unreported and prompt remedial action had not been taken.
Overloaded and damaged electrical outlet and adaptor
Hull Breached at Unsafe Berth: MARS 201308
On completing discharge, a tanker was ordered by the port to vacate the berth and tie up at a waiting berth, about 8 miles upriver. The assigned berth was identified with some difficulty on the chart and was seen to be on a sharp bend in the river. A passage plan was made with the limited information available onboard, and, during the transit, the pilot provided more details of the berth. He mentioned that the jetty was partly damaged and had two pontoon barges secured to it and that the vessel was to moor starboard side to them. The Master was advised that the final line configuration would be 3+2+2 forward and aft and that about a mile before the berth, two ‘powerful’ tugs would assist the mooring operation with ship’s lines from the port bow and quarter. The plan was explained to the C/O and 2/O before they proceeded to their respective mooring stations. Meanwhile, the deck crew rigged portable fenders just above the water level as the pilot warned that the steel pontoons had none and also prepared ship’s lines for the tugs on the port side. Just before the tugs approached on the Master’s instructions, the C/O prepared the port anchor for letting go in an emergency. Contrary to what the pilot had stated earlier, both tugs appeared to be too small and underpowered for the tanker’s size, and they refused to make fast the ship’s lines. To the shock and disbelief of the vessel’s bridge team, the pilot denied that he had ever implied that the tugs were to be made fast. With no possibility of aborting the manoeuvre, the vessel was forced to attempt berthing without the benefit of controlling towlines.
The tanker passed two bulk carriers double-banked at the wharf close downstream and then prepared to approach the two pontoon barges secured in line at her assigned berth. Considering the length of his ship, the Master estimated a final overhang of about 25 metres at each end.
He also noticed that the middle section of the pier, inshore of the two barges, was missing.
A strong current was setting the ship sideways on to the pontoons and wharf. With no meaningful tug assistance, a very tense and stressed Master heeded the pilot’s rapid engine and rudder orders. To add to his worries, the C/O reported from the forecastle deck that the collapsed portion of the jetty appeared to be extending into the river. The vessel was drifting astern with the ebb current and the 2/O reported that the distance to the bulkers was only 20 metres and closing rapidly. An urgent ahead movement on the engine took the tanker ahead by an estimated 50 metres when the engine was stopped and the Master ordered the port anchor to be let go. Holding on to 2 shackles of chain, the vessel was being brought sideways towards the pontoons, when a loud grating noise was heard along the starboard shell plating accompanied by intense shuddering.
After securing to the shore with unusually long lines, it was discovered that the empty fore peak tank was holed below the waterline. Fortunately, the ballast pump was able to cope with the inflow and a zero tank sounding was easily maintained. The company’s emergency procedures were followed and appropriate reports were sent to the office. The next day, when the tank was carefully opened for the class surveyor, a mooring bollard was found tightly wedged in the hole at the bottom of the tank, partly stemming the inflow. It was decided not to disturb the bollard, which fortuitously acted like a plug. It is presumed that the impact dislodged the bollard from the submerged collapsed section of the pier. The surveyor issued a temporary permit to sail to the nearest drydock for permanent repairs and the vessel departed from the port.
During the Master-pilot information exchange before departure, the swinging area about 0.5 mile downstream from the berth was shown on the chart and it was also revealed that a harbour tug had recently sunk in mid-channel. The Master was horrified that the pilot who conducted the vessel inward had omitted to relay this crucial information. After casting off the berth just after slack water, the vessel’s stern-first exit was assisted by two large tugs. In order to avoid the new unmarked wreck, the pilot executed the swing closer to the shoal ground on the west bank, which gave the Master more anxiety, as the tugs appeared to be turning the vessel with minimum power.
During the short passage to drydock, all tanks were monitored and the ballast pump was continuously discharging the ingress into the fore peak tank. Regular situation reports were sent to the management team ashore. In the drydock, it was observed that apart from the large hole punched in the shell plating in way of the fore peak tank, there was no other damage.
Representation of tanker after berthing (not to scale)
Lesson Learnt
It may be advantageous to appoint an independent owner’s agent or a port captain in ‘difficult’ ports, where reliable navigational and commercial information may not be readily provided by charterers/local authorities.
Fatality in Slop Tank: MARS 201309
(Edited from IMCA Safety Flash 06-11)
The C/O of a tanker in port was planning to carry out maintenance of valves inside an empty slop tank. The day before the planned maintenance, he instructed the Bosun to open the access hatch of the tank and to start ventilating with air so that it would be gas-free before tank entry the next morning. As this task needed no man entry, no enclosed space entry procedures were followed. Shortly afterwards, the C/O and deck crew working nearby on deck heard a noise as if an object had fallen into the tank. They rushed to the open manhole and saw the Bosun lying motionless on the top platform of the vertical ladder, about 5 metres below the main deck. Sending the crew to raise the alarm and to bring the necessary rescue gear and stationing a lone seaman outside the tank entrance, the C/O entered the tank with the intention of helping the Bosun. The watching crewmember observed the C/O descending the ladder and then trying to rouse the Bosun. Immediately, he saw the C/O collapsing next to the Bosun. In panic, the seaman also entered the tank to help the C/O and Bosun. All three persons became unconscious in the tank.
Soon after, the emergency team led by the 2/O arrived at the entrance. The portable gas analyser that he used to sample the tank atmosphere instantly sounded the H2S alarm and showed values of O2: 20%, CO: 0%, H2S: 60 ppm and LEL: 0%. Quickly donning a breathing apparatus (CABA / SCBA), he entered the tank, and soon all three casualties were lifted out of the tank. They were immediately transported to a shore hospital by helicopter (medevac), where the C/O and seaman made a full recovery, but unfortunately, the Bosun could not be revived and died.
Result of Investigation
- As there was no witness, it could not be ascertained why the Bosun had entered the tank and how he fell off the vertical ladder.
- The C/O entered the tank impulsively to rescue the Bosun, ignoring the hazards and safety procedures.
- The crewman stationed at the tank entrance also reacted emotionally rather than logically, and entered the tank to assist the two casualties.
- The emergency team responded correctly, identifying the presence of toxic gas, before mounting the recovery operation in accordance with company procedures.
- It could not be adequately deduced how a lethal concentration of H2S gas had developed in the slop tanks.
Acknowledgement
Through the kind intermediary of The Nautical Institute we gratefully acknowledge sponsorship provided by:
American Bureau of Shipping, AR Brink & Associates, Britannia P&I Club, Cargill, Class NK, Consult ISM, DNV, Gard, International Institute of Marine Surveying, Lairdside Maritime Centre, London Offshore Consultants, Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay Safety at Sea International, MOL Tankship Management (Europe) Ltd, Noble Denton, North of England P&I Club, Port of Tyne, Sail Training International, Shipowners Club, The Marine Society and Sea Cadets, The Swedish Club, UK Hydrographic Office, UK P&I Club
Submit a Mars Report
More reports are needed to keep the scheme interesting and informative. All reports are read only by the Mars coordinator and are treated in the strictest confidence. To submit a report please use the Mars report form and send it to mars@nautinst.org.
