A selection of the Mars Report No. 263 will appear in SWZ Maritime's upcoming October issue. Read the full report here on SWZonline.nl.
Mars (Marine Accident Reporting Scheme) Report is one of the regular sections of SWZ Maritime. The reports are also published online, as they may prevent other accidents from happening. Mars Reports cover all kinds of maritime incidents such as (near) collisions and groundings, accidents with tools, falling objects injuring crew and accidents with rescue boats.
“Own Goal” as Tow Collides with Tug: Mars 201446
Edited from official MAIB report 10-2014
An unmanned, decommissioned fisheries protection vessel was under tow when it developed a list of about 10 degrees to port. The tug’s master informed the tug company’s managers and then called the local coastguard authority to request permission to seek shelter in a nearby bay and investigate the cause of the list. In preparation for this, he reduced the scope of the tow from 480 metres to 200 metres and altered course towards the place of refuge. The master was informed by the coastguard that he would need to take a pilot to enter the bay since he was not simply seeking shelter, but intending to board the towed vessel to investigate the list. The master subsequently decided to anchor the tug and tow in the deep anchorage outside the bay where no pilot was required.
The weather at the deep anchorage was light winds, slight sea and good visibility. The tidal stream was north-easterly about 0.9 kt. The master’s plan was to anchor the tug and then board the towed vessel himself to investigate the cause of the list. He reduced the length of the tow further, to 100 metres, and stopped the tug downtide of the tow. An officer was forward with a seaman and the master and the chief engineer were on the bridge. The towed vessel was about 60 metres away when the master ordered to let go the port anchor and put one shackle of chain in the water. At this point, control of the anchor windlass was transferred to the bridge and the cable was walked out.
The anchoring had the effect of pivoting the tug to port, stopping it in the water, side-on to the tide and in the path of the tow, which maintained its momentum. When 1½ shackles were in the water, the master stopped walking out the anchor cable and used the searchlight to locate the towed vessel, which had been lost visually. A few seconds later, the towed vessel was seen closing the port side of the tug at right angles.
The master immediately attempted evasive action to avoid a collision, but the towed vessel struck the tow just aft of midships on the port side. As the master attempted to manoeuvre clear, he was informed that there was major water ingress to the engine room. The towed vessel’s bow had penetrated the tug’s shell plating below the waterline in way of the hydraulic motors in the engine room. The master called the coastguard on VHF, advised them that the engine room was flooding and requested immediate assistance. Meanwhile, the hydraulic pump motors failed due to water ingress resulting in the immediate loss of all hydraulic power, which disabled the windlass. Concerned that the vessel might sink, the master released the tow and put both engines full ahead in an attempt to dredge the anchor into shallower water.
Tug (left) and towed vessel (right).
Although the tug was later saved due to the actions of the master and the quick response of local authorities, the towed vessel eventually sank.
The official investigation found the following:
- The master’s lack of appreciation of the dangers resulting from tidal effects on the tow when anchoring was a direct contributing factor.
- The master contacted the company as soon as he became concerned about the list on the towed vessel. However, there were no instructions or guidance in the company’s procedures regarding the use of senior, experienced staff from the management company to assist masters in planning their response to crisis situations such as this. Had the master developed a plan in conjunction with senior, experienced staff from the company, it is likely that the tidal conditions would have been taken into account.
- Had the master taken a pilot, the subsequent anchoring would have been better prepared and therefore (probably) not have resulted in a collision.
Sideways under the Bridge: Mars 201447
Edited from official report RS 2014:01e from the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority
A small dry cargo carrier was en route in a vessel traffic services (VTS) controlled restricted waterway and, because of its size, was without a pilot. This was the first time the master had navigated this section of the waterway. At 05:20 the vessel reported to VTS at a calling-in point, at which time the VTS gave information on expected traffic. The master started his watch at 06:00. At about noon, with both the master and chief officer on the bridge, the vessel arrived at a bridge where extensive maintenance work was in progress on the fendering.
As the vessel approached the bridge, it was conned towards the port side of the channel to line up the passage under the bridge. The speed was about nine knots, despite a speed limit of five knots that should have been observed at this point. The master stated that something appeared to happen to the steering and that they lost control over the vessel. At that point the engine was put to full astern and the vessel naturally veered to starboard (right hand propeller), colliding with the fendering. The speed of the vessel at the time of the collision was just over four knots.
Normal approach to bridge (fendering can be seen on either side).
On both fenders alongside the bridge there were many people carrying out various repair work. They had seen the vessel and, from the unusual approach movements, realised that the vessel was about to collide with the repair site. While trying to avoid being hit by the vessel one person fell into the water, but managed to climb out of the water himself without being hurt.
After the collision the vessel did not stop, but continued on its journey.
The official report found, among other things, that:
- VTS did not provide the vessel with any information about the construction works when the vessel reported its position at the various reporting points along the way.
- The bridge repairs were reported in Swedish notices to mariners (in Swedish and English). However, the charts and publications carried by the vessel were British Admiralty, and the UK Hydrographic Office did not publish this particular information on the bridge repair works.
- The fact that the vessel personnel were unaware of the ongoing repair work on the bridge probably affected the master’s actions and contributed in part to the accident.
No anomalies were found with the steering system, so inadequate shiphandling was probably a factor. A substantial decrease in engine power was applied immediately before the turn to starboard in order to reduce speed. This in turn led to an impaired steering effect since the propeller wash had by then decreased or stopped altogether. This, in turn, could have been experienced as though there was something wrong with the steering.
Editor’s note: Good ship handling is anticipation, not reaction. By arriving close to the bridge at too high a speed, the master reduced his options and unwittingly set in motion a series of events that led to the heavy contact with the bridge fendering. Of course, as in many accidents, there are several contributing factors. In this case, the facts that the master was new to this part of the waterway and that he was unaware of the repair works and the required speed reduction were also contributory.
A Few Steps Too Many: Mars 201448
Edited from official report of the Dutch Safety Board, Sept 2012
A small general cargo vessel was entering a lock and a spring line had been passed ashore. As the vessel’s propulsion was going astern in order to stop the vessel, the master reported by VHF radio to the deck crew that the vessel was "in position" – although the vessel was still advancing at about 0.7 knots.
The winch brake was fully tightened and almost immediately, and without warning, the synthetic spring line broke.
At this same time, a seaman had walked forward a few steps to retrieve a heaving line that had been thrown back to the vessel from ashore. This caused him to enter the snap back zone for the spring just as it broke. The seaman was hit by the mooring line and was killed almost instantly.
The official investigation found among other things that:
- The crew may not have been aware of all of the risks involved for mooring operations.
- Some publications used for informing mariners of snap back zones underestimate the extent of these zones. Other publications, such as those by The Nautical Institute or Seahealth Denmark are more accurate.
- A recently published IMO document (2013), MSC 92/inf.11, also has clear guidance to help prevent accidents while mooring.
No One Obeys the Rules – Classic Collision: Mars 201449
Edited from official report (16 May 2013) by the Hong Kong SAR Marine Accident Investigation Section
The weather was fine with light winds, a smooth sea and visibility of about 4nm. The red vessel [see image] was making way at about 12.5 knots. The pilot on the red vessel observed a radar target, the green vessel, on a radar bearing two points on the port bow at a range of 1.8 nm. The green vessel was also visually observed to be a crossing vessel that the pilot estimated would cross ahead at 0.5 nm. He assessed that a close-quarters situation was developing due to the green crossing vessel and other traffic such as the blue vessel on their starboard bow.
A continuous sound signal was given from the red vessel’s whistle for about thirty seconds to attract the attention of the crossing vessel. For the time being the red vessel maintained its course (338°T) and speed.
A few minutes later, in order to allow more room for the green vessel and other traffic in the vicinity, the pilot ordered a speed reduction; first to slow ahead, then dead slow ahead and stop. A few minutes later the green vessel was observed to be crossing ahead at a range of four cables. To allow the green vessel to pass ahead even sooner the pilot ordered the helm ten degrees to port.
While the vessel was swinging to port, the green vessel was observed to alter course to starboard. In an attempt to avoid collision, the pilot aboard the red vessel ordered the helm to midship and then hard-to-starboard while the engine was at dead slow ahead. At about this time the red ship sounded three prolonged blasts of the vessel’s whistle. Shortly thereafter, the bridge team members felt the vessel shudder; it was suspected that a collision had occurred with the green vessel.
Red vessel.
Green vessel.
Meanwhile, on the green vessel, the only person on the bridge responsible for steering the vessel and keeping a proper lookout was the OOW. As the green vessel was proceeding at a speed of about five knots, the red vessel was observed heading north in the fairway. The OOW initially assessed that there was sufficient room for his vessel to pass clear ahead of the red vessel. Within a few minutes he realised his assessment was wrong, so he altered course to starboard attempting to give way and pass clear. At this juncture, the red vessel was observed to be altering course to port heading towards his vessel. In order to avoid collision, the OOW then altered course to port. Despite these actions there was a collision with the red vessel.
Following the collision, the green vessel’s engine compartment was flooded and the vessel finally foundered some two hours later. Its six crew boarded the vessel’s lifeboat and were rescued. The red vessel sustained paint scratches to the starboard bow.
The investigation revealed the following contributing factors:
- The green vessel, being the give-way vessel in a crossing situation, failed to comply with Rule 15 (Crossing situation) and Rule 16 (Action by give-way vessel) of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGS) for not taking early and substantial action to keep out of the way of the red vessel.
- The red vessel, being a stand-on vessel in a crossing situation, failed to comply with Rule 17 (Action by stand-on vessel) of the COLREGS but [reduced speed and] altered course to port to avoid collision with the green vessel.
- Instead of a continuous sound signal of thirty seconds, or even the three prolonged blasts just before the collision, the red vessel should have sounded at least five short and rapid blasts on the whistle when it failed to understand the intentions or actions of the green vessel.
- Weather and visibility, conditions of navigational equipment and main engines, alcohol, drug and fatigue issues were not found to be contributing factors to the accident.
Editor’s comment: If you were OOW or master on the red vessel, what would you have done, given the pilot’s action to reduce speed and eventually come to port even though they were the stand-on vessel? Not an easy situation for anyone.
Acknowledgement
Through the kind intermediary of The Nautical Institute we gratefully acknowledge sponsorship provided by:
American Bureau of Shipping, AR Brink & Associates, Britannia P&I Club, Cargill, Class NK, DNV, Gard, IHS Fairplay Safety at Sea International, International Institute of Marine Surveying, Lairdside Maritime Centre, London Offshore Consultants, MOL Tankship Management (Europe) Ltd, Noble Denton, North of England P&I Club, Sail Training International, Shipowners Club, The Marine Society and Sea Cadets, The Swedish Club, UK Hydrographic Office, West of England P&I Club
Submit a Mars Report
More reports are needed to keep the scheme interesting and informative. All reports are read only by the Mars coordinator and are treated in the strictest confidence. To submit a report please use the Mars report form and send it to mars@nautinst.org.
