A selection of the Mars Report No. 262 will appear in SWZ Maritime's upcoming September issue. Read the full report here on SWZonline.nl.
Mars (Marine Accident Reporting Scheme) Report is one of the regular sections of SWZ Maritime. The reports are also published online, as they may prevent other accidents from happening. Mars Reports cover all kinds of maritime incidents such as (near) collisions and groundings, accidents with tools, falling objects injuring crew and accidents with rescue boats.
Booby Hatch Unsecured: Mars 201441
Personal access to a hold through hatch covers is possible via special openings often called booby hatches. When a person wants to use them, they usually have to hold the booby hatch as support for the first few steps as they enter or exit. An authority for a large port reports that there have been numerous cases where the booby hatch locking pin was not in place. This resulted in the booby hatch inadvertently moving on its hinge while the person was using the hatch; some injuries have resulted. Although no serious injuries are known to have happened, there is certainly a possibility of falling into the hold, which would result

Ship’s crew should ensure that the locking pins are always properly secured whenever the booby hatch is in the open position.
Thread Mismatch Impairs Fire Extinguisher: Mars 201442
Edited from USCG Safety Alert 03-14
During a fire investigation onboard a vessel it was discovered that a portable carbon dioxide (CO2) extinguisher had failed to properly discharge during the fire-fighting event. CO2 only seeped from the neck of the extinguisher when it was used, rather than sprayed. The fire was subsequently extinguished using a dry-chemical fire extinguisher.
During examination it was found that the hose and discharge horn had been replaced. The end of the hose screws on to a diffuser on the side of the discharge valve/handle assembly of the extinguisher. The diffuser is a ported protrusion on the male end of a 90° fitting. On the side of the protrusion are orifices through which the CO2 flows. The examination revealed that the spherical end of the protrusion, which contains no orifices, ‘bottomed out’ against the orifice in the connection fitting that leads to the hose and horn assembly. The flow of CO2 was thus completely blocked.
It was further noted that the male threads of the diffuser were tapered US national pipe threads, while the female threads of the hose connection were straight. This thread mis-match likely allowed the hose connection to be tightened to a greater extent than intended on the diffuser threads. This permitted the spherical end of the diffuser to ‘bottom out’ against the orifice in the tube. This may have also resulted in the reported leakage from the neck of the extinguisher due to back pressure.

There are newer types of diffusers in which the orifice follows the length of the protrusion and the end is not spherical. However, the issues regarding the tightening of the two components and the importance of ensuring proper lengths and compatibility of the threaded and machined surfaces remain. Binding or ‘bottoming out’ should not occur except at the threaded surfaces. Replacement parts should be as specified by the equipment manufacturer and servicing should always be done by qualified fire safety equipment technicians.
Three Metre Fall Causes Death: Mars 201443
Edited from official report from the Hong Kong SAR Marine Accident Investigation Section
While berthed and after discharging cargo, crew were instructed to clean the hold. As one rating climbed a portable ladder another rating steadied it. The rating climbing the ladder wore a safety helmet and a safety harness, but on the way up he was not attached to anything. He was headed up to the ring attachment to secure his harness. Once at the level of the ring, he attempted to fasten the lifeline, which was about one metre to his right. As he extended himself to attach the lifeline he lost his balance and fell to the tank top three metres below.
Within thirty minutes an ambulance had arrived and taken the victim to hospital. Unfortunately, eight days later the victim succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced dead.

The investigation found the following:
- There was no evidence of fatigue in this accident.
- The distance from the right handhold of the ladder to the centre of the metal ring was about one metre. The average hand reach of males of the victim’s nationality is about 0.6 metre. Therefore, it was a risk for the rating to fasten his lifeline under this condition. The risk could have been reduced if the ladder was placed closer to the metal ring.
- The main contributing factor of the accident was the work attitude and safety consciousness of the victim. He should have stopped the operation and climbed down the ladder. The operation should only have resumed after the ladder had been properly aligned closer to the safety ring.
Editor’s note: What an unfortunate outcome for such an ordinary task that should have been safe. Everyone just wants to get the job done, often without enough regard for their own safety. In this case, the solution was so simple, yet the rating chose to attempt the manoeuvre nonetheless – overextending himself and losing his balance; possibly lulled into a false sense of security as he was not that high. But as witnessed here, three metres is enough to kill.
Fatigue Wins Again as Ship Hits Seawall at 15 Knots: Mars 201444
Edited from official report MA2014-1, Japan Transport Safety Board
In the early morning hours, but still in darkness, a small container ship was making way at about 15 knots on autopilot with the officer of the watch (OOW) as the sole watchkeeper on the bridge. The visibility was good and there was no traffic, so the master had given the instruction for the OOW to be alone on the bridge while making way in darkness. A few hours into his watch the OOW began to feel drowsy, so he began walking briskly around the wheelhouse. He then sat in the chair in front of one of the radars, confident he would not fall asleep. Somewhere between buoys four and five as they made landfall he fell asleep.
About forty to fity minutes later, at approximately 04:40, he woke up abruptly when he was thrown out of the chair by the impact of a collision. The vessel had hit the sea wall on the northern side of a nearby bridge. The ship was not equipped with a bridge watch navigation alarm system (BWNAS) at the time of the accident, nor was it required to have one.


Lessons Learned
- Had a proper lookout been assigned to assist the OOW, it is unlikely the collision would have transpired.
- Had the OOW reported his drowsiness to the master, alternative watch arrangements could have been made.
Editor’s note: Although this ship was ostensibly operating under a three watch system, fatigue can affect anyone if proper “sleep hygiene” is not practised. It has been demonstrated in numerous studies that the average person needs seven to eight hours of continuous sleep for it to be truly recuperative. Working while fatigued is equivalent to working while under the influence of alcohol. Although a BWNAS is a device that can help prevent accidents like this (and today this ship would be required to have one), the real solution is proper rest for all crew and a proper lookout.
Watertight Door Fatality: Mars 201445
Edited from official report 09-202, Transport Accident Investigation Commission for New Zealand
While at berth, the crew of a small passenger ship were conducting a fire and emergency drill, which included closing and testing the hydraulically operated watertight doors. The master closed the watertight doors remotely from the bridge. Some minutes later, the chief engineer opened the watertight door to the engine room, but for some reason he became trapped by the door as he passed through the doorway. He remained trapped for more than eight minutes before being found and freed. He was resuscitated, but never regained consciousness and later died in hospital. The door closing pressure was later measured to be 1650 kg.
The watertight doors were normally set in the local-control mode, which meant that they could not be remotely closed from the wheelhouse. At the time of the accident, the doors were in the remote-close mode for the exercise, which meant they would automatically close when the user released the opening handle. The crew routinely passed through the watertight doors without fully opening them when the doors were in the local-control mode. This practice was probably also followed when the doors were in the remote-close mode. It is possible that the victim tried to pass through the door before it was fully open, and for some reason (such as releasing the handle) it began closing and trapped him.
The investigation found that, among other things:
- It was common practice on board not to fully open watertight doors before passing through. It is possible that the victim did not fully open the door on this occasion, which would have contributed to his becoming trapped.
- The doors were set to close with a speed that was twice the maximum allowable under the Solas regulations (which specify never less than twenty seconds). This would likely have contributed to the victim becoming trapped.

- The door operating handle protruded farther inside the watertight doorway space than was necessary. This meant the victim was not able to free himself when the door closed on him.
- The watertight doors on board the vessel had not been maintained and tested in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and did not meet the performance standards required by the IMO and the Flag State Administration.
- The audible door closing alarm was not working after the accident. If it was not working at the time of the accident, that could have contributed to the victim becoming trapped in the door.
- The safety management system on board the vessel did not deal in an appropriate way with the maintenance, testing and operation of the watertight doors, which were safety-critical apparatus that presented a known risk to the crew.
Lessons Learned
- Always wait for a watertight door to be fully open before passing through the doorway when the door is in the remote-close mode.
- The faster the door closes, the greater the risk.
- Under no circumstances should watertight doors be set to close faster than the maximum allowable speed.
- Ship operators should adopt specific procedures for operating watertight doors in both local-control and remote-close modes. The procedures should be compatible with the doors’ purpose and design, and the frequency with which they are used.
- Legislation governing the design and use of watertight doors should be flexible enough to achieve appropriate procedures for the use of any watertight door in any mode.
- Poorly maintained watertight doors are dangerous. Shipboard planned maintenance systems should be designed and followed to ensure that watertight doors are maintained in accordance with manufacturers’ instructions, and in accordance with good standard marine engineering practice.
Acknowledgement
Through the kind intermediary of The Nautical Institute we gratefully acknowledge sponsorship provided by:
American Bureau of Shipping, AR Brink & Associates, Britannia P&I Club, Cargill, Class NK, DNV, Gard, IHS Fairplay Safety at Sea International, International Institute of Marine Surveying, Lairdside Maritime Centre, London Offshore Consultants, MOL Tankship Management (Europe) Ltd, Noble Denton, North of England P&I Club, Sail Training International, Shipowners Club, The Marine Society and Sea Cadets, The Swedish Club, UK Hydrographic Office, West of England P&I Club
Submit a Mars Report
More reports are needed to keep the scheme interesting and informative. All reports are read only by the Mars coordinator and are treated in the strictest confidence. To submit a report please use the Mars report form and send it to mars@nautinst.org.







