(MARS 201879) A tug was towing a loaded barge in coastal waters when a fire alarm for the upper engine room activated on the wheelhouse fire panel.

As edited from NTSB official report MAB 17/28

The OOW tried to reset the alarm and to establish whether it had activated falsely; however, the alarm continued to sound. Moments later, a crew member alerted the wheelhouse that he had seen smoke.

The master and the rest of the crew quickly arrived in the wheelhouse with lifejackets and immersion suits in hand. The master instructed an officer to take a radio and investigate the fire. The officer reported that the space was inaccessible and said to start the fire pump due to the severity of the smoke. The fire quickly spread to the dining room, galley, and several cabins located on the main deck.

Fire-fighting Attempts Ceased

The master attempted to slow the vessel and manoeuvre in such a way as to prevent the barge from over-running the tug, and to prevent the fire and smoke emanating from the upper engine room from being carried aft. However, the vessel quickly lost all power. Thereafter, the crew ceased attempting to fight the fire due to its intensity and rapid growth.

Abandon Ship

The master informed the coast guard of the situation and the crew made preparations for abandonment. With the vessel now dead in the water, the master was concerned about the fire and smoke engulfing the entire vessel and crew. They inflated and boarded the liferaft and then manoeuvred away from the tug to escape the extreme heat and explosions now occurring aboard the vessel.


The vessel before and after the fire.

Constructive Total Loss

The crew were picked up by a nearby private sport fishing vessel and taken to the closest port. When the fire burned itself out the following morning, the hulk was towed back to port. Due to the extent of the fire damage, the vessel was later declared a constructive total loss.

Finding of the Official Report

The probable cause of the fire was an ignition originating near an electrical fuse box in the upper engine room. Contributing to the intensity of the fire was the presence of combustible materials in the upper engine room, which included a drum of waste oil.

Lessons Learned

  • Engine room areas should be kept clean and free of unnecessary objects and stores, as these can act as fuel for any potential fire.

MARS Reports

This is one of the December MARS Reports that are part of Report Number 314. A selection of this Report has also been published in SWZ|Maritime’s January issue.

Acknowledgement

Through the kind intermediary of The Nautical Institute we gratefully acknowledge sponsorship provided by:
American Bureau of Shipping, AR Brink & Associates, Britannia P&I Club, Cargill, Class NK, DNV, Gard, IHS Fairplay Safety at Sea International, International Institute of Marine Surveying, Lairdside Maritime Centre, London Offshore Consultants, MOL Tankship Management (Europe) Ltd, Noble Denton, North of England P&I Club, Sail Training International, Shipowners Club, The Marine Society and Sea Cadets, The Swedish Club, UK Hydrographic Office, West of England P&I Club

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