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Marine Accident Reporting Scheme (Mars) Report No. 292
Unsafe Practices Become the Norm: Mars 201707
Edited from official UK Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report 6-2016
A car carrier sailed from port under the con of a pilot, with 1633 cars and various heavy equipment loaded. The ship proceeded out, making good a speed of 10 kts when the pilot gave the first helm order to starboard. The turn was completed without incident, the ship heeling to port and returning upright as expected.
A few minutes later, as the car carrier entered the main channel, the pilot requested that the ship’s speed be increased.
Meanwhile, the chief officer was still undertaking final stability calculations in the cargo control room. He became concerned that the indicated metacentric height (GM) on the stability computer was less than his earlier departure stability calculation had predicted. He sent the deck cadet to take soundings of the three aft peak tanks in preparation for loading additional ballast water. The chief officer began setting up the ballast system as he anticipated that he would require additional ballast
in the aft peak tanks.
As the vessel made the next turn, this time to port, it heeled progressively to starboard until its rudder and propeller were clear of the water. The vessel then suffered a blackout. Several cargo units and items of ship’s equipment broke free from their lashings and shifted as the ship heeled. This resulted in a hole being punctured through the shell plating in way of
the ship’s gangway recess, allowing sea water to enter deck 6 when it became submerged.
Two tugs were tasked by vessel traffic services (VTS) to proceed towards the vessel and assist as required. Eventually, the car carrier grounded. The inclinometer on the bridge was indicating a list of 40° to starboard. Following the accident, all 24 crew were successfully evacuated from the ship or recovered from the surrounding waters. There was no pollution. A major salvage operation successfully refloated the vessel and it was taken to a safe berth.
Official Findings
A key finding of the official investigation is that a departure stability calculation had not been carried out on completion of cargo operations and before the car carrier sailed. Witness and anecdotal evidence suggests that
this practice extends to the car carrier sector in general.
The critical task of establishing whether the ship has a suitable margin of stability for the intended voyage before departure had been eroded on board. This unsafe practice had become the norm.
Many contributing factors were interconnected with the unsafe practices, such as:
• The actual cargo weight and stowage were significantly different from the final cargo tally supplied to the ship.
• Cargo unit VCGs (vertical centres of gravity) were not considered when calculating the stability condition.
• The vessel’s ballast tank gauges were broken. As a consequence, the quantities were estimated. These differed significantly
from actual tank levels.
Editor’s note: Master and crew were working in contradiction to the company SMS and good seamanship. Even a cursory safety audit by the company could have easily established this before the accident. Establishing procedures
is critical, but ensuring they are followed is equally important.
Crane Boom Falls into Hold: Mars 201710
Edited from official report RS 2014e from the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK)
A general cargo vessel was in port loading packaged timber. The ship was moored to a large barge equipped with a knuckle boom crane. This was being used to load the ship, together with one of the ship’s own cranes. Two stevedores worked together in the ship’s cargo hold, directing the loading and uncoupling the sling. No other member of the stevedoring
team was on board to act as signalman or hatch boss to supervise and control the loading operation from the ship’s deck.
The ship’s crane had difficulties reaching certain zones of the cargo hold; this resulted in the crane arm being operated close to or even beyond its lower limit. When cargo handling had been ongoing for around a day and a half the topping cable released from the winch drum and the crane arm fell into the cargo hold, landing about half a metre from the stevedores. Fortunately, there were no physical injuries.
The official SHK investigation found, among other things, that;
• The ship’s crane had been modified. An extra switch had been installed, which, when activated, bypassed the crane’s limit
switches for maximum lowering. It appears the modification had been made bya previous operator and crew. The reason
for the modification could not be determined.
• Bypassing the limit switches allowed the crane boom to be lowered to a level that was too low for cargo handling, and to a
point where there was not enough cable remaining on the winch drum to hold the combined weight of the crane boom and
cargo load.
• The present crew, relatively new to the ship, had not discovered the bypass switch during the course of their own inspections.
• The crane operator did not perform a full operational check of the crane before the start of lifting manoeuvres. Such a checkmay well have helped in the discovery of the nonconforming bypass switch.
Lessons Learned
• Never bypass safety equipment such as limit switches.
• Always do full operational tests before using cargo handling equipment.
• Always use a signalman during cargo operations.
Bottom Contact Goes Unnoticed: Mars 201712
A relatively small LPG carrier, in ballast, was being manoeuvred under pilotage in port with two tugs secured on the starboard side. The vessel was equipped with twin propellers and rudders. Once near the berth, the vessel was pivoted to starboard so as to come port side to. Forward speed was now near zero and both tugs were helping execute the manoeuvre.
Due to the moderate north east wind, the vessel began to drift astern during the turn.
The vessel was drawing 5.3 m aft and as the stern came close to the 5 m bathymetric line, the master informed the pilot. The pilot did not appear to take any specific avoiding action and the master did not challenge the pilot further. The pivoting manoeuvre was continued, as seen in the diagram, and although the stern swung through water shallower than the aft draft, no impact or vibrations were felt. Within a few minutes the vessel was secured alongside the berth.
Unknown to master, pilot and crew, the port side rudder had made contact with the bottom during the pivoting manoeuvre, causing the rudder stock to turn within the steering gear actuator by almost 25 degrees from its midship position. However, the rudder indicators were showing that the rudder was still amidship. This situation was only discovered upon departure, when steering was found to be unreliable and inexplicably unresponsive. The vessel quickly went to anchor and divers soon
confirmed that the rudder was misaligned, although the rudder itself was physically undamaged.
Lessons Learned
• Before beginning a manoeuvre such as turning your vessel over 90° in a restricted waterway, ensure the vessel is appropriately positioned to safely accomplish this move. In this case, given the NE wind, the turn appears to have been initiated too close to the southern edge of the dredged area, which left little margin for error.
• In this case, the rudder tests before departure did not reveal the misalignment that had occurred during the previous
berthing.
• Even though contact with the bottom had been initially discounted due to the lack of vibrations or other indicators, the stern
had swept through an area of less depth than the draft; contact should have been assumed and verified before departure.
• One of the key principles of Bridge Resources Management (BRM) is the “challenge”.
In this case, the master “informed” the pilot of the imminent danger, but appears not to have insisted that positive
action be initiated to avoid the shallow area astern.
Getting More Than a Charge: Mars 201713
Edited from Marine Safety Forum Safety Alert 16-09
A small fire was discovered in a crew member’s cabin and quickly extinguished. The crew member, who was not in his cabin at the time, had left a battery pack used for charging small appliances in the “charging mode”. The investigation to date seems to indicate the battery pack probably overheated causing the unit to melt. The battery pack under review
appears to be an inexpensive, low quality unit.
Lessons Learned
• The use of non-original chargers for domestic appliances should be prohibited.
• The charging of power banks should be regarded with caution and risk assessments undertaken.
• The engineering team should check and rate all electrical equipment brought on board against the ship’s power supply.
• Never leave domestic electrical components charging or on standby unattended.
If you leave the area, switch everything off at the source or unplug it.







